Croft’s appeal against compensation awarded to three local residents over “excessive noise” from the circuit has been dismissed, and further an injunction has been granted limiting higher noise levels to 40 days per year.

There is, inevitably, anger from fans, blaming everyone and everything.

There are, from where I’m standing, four bits to look at: the motivation of the claimants, the legal principle, the judge’s individual judgement, and the precedent it sets.

I’m no expert, but I have read the Court of Appeal judgement. So this is my take on all of it.

Motivation of the claimants

Much of the anger is directed at the claimants: Derek and Julia Watson, and their daughter Jill Wilson. Jill Wilson is the ex-wife of Jimmy Wilson, one of the founders of the company which manages Croft. Much has been made of this.

The fact that Croft has hosted motorsport since 1949 is the other fact much shouted about in criticism of the claimants – basically they should expect and accept the noise.

But that argument rather falls down when you realise that the circuit’s history isn’t terribly consistent, and it’s only since 1998 that the number of days in use per year has ramped up.

But whatever questions there might be surrounding their motivation, and whether it’s right or wrong for them to make the claim in the first place, the claim is legally acceptable. We might not like it, but there it is.

Legal principle

Through a fairly complicated sequence of events, Croft had limits on noise levels adopted under planning regulations. These were 40 days at N1 to N2 noise levels (race meetings), and including those up to 110 days at N1 to N4 levels (testing and track days).

One defence is that these planning regulations changed the “nature and character of the neighbourhood” so that the noise levels set out should constitute reasonable use.

But the legal principle is that planning authorities do not have “jurisdiction to authorise a nuisance.” So noise even within those limits can be judged a nuisance.

However, planning authorities “may have the power to permit a change in the character of a neighbourhood.”

So it comes down to a decision on what is a reasonable use of Croft. And that’s down to the judge.

The judge’s individual judgement

The judge rejected the change of nature and character of the neighbourhood argument – and for what it’s worth I’d tend to agree. It’s hard to argue that the surrounds of Croft are not “rural”. Have a look for yourself.

Within the context of a rural neighbourhood, then, what is reasonable use? According to the judge, 40 days at N1 to N4 noise levels.

The claimants were after 20 days, and another 20 days with compensation; the defendants were after 110 days as above.

The defendant’s appeal called the judge’s threshold “perverse and insufficiently reasoned,” and I can see what they mean. The appeal judge didn’t, however: “It was a matter for his judgment, not for any further reasoning.”

My main problem is that in their initial submission, the claimants were not objecting to the race events at the circuit, which take about 45-50 days at N1 and N2 noise levels. But these have been impacted by the 40 day limit. And that strikes me as an injustice.

Precedent

A worry amongst fans is that this sets a dangerous precedent. But does it?

For Croft: clearly. The company is “extremely disappointed” with the decision which has “serious implications for the circuit and the motor racing industry generally,” and is “reviewing the position carefully.”

The future of Croft may depend on other local residents resisting the temptation to cash in, which would surely risk the future of the circuit – if indeed it can cope with the hefty compensation it already has to pay out.

I’m not sure how immediately applicable the case is to other circuits though.

Silverstone, Donington and Silverstone have surely changed the nature of their neighbourhoods to the point that reasonable use of the circuits would be sufficiently high to defend themselves.

Smaller circuits might be more vulnerable, but those with more consistent activity over a longer period than Croft might fare better on what constitutes reasonable use.

Only time, and the willingness or otherwise of other residents living near race tracks to make claims, will tell.